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COMMENTS
The Constitutional Minimum for the Termination of
Welfare Benefits: The Need for and
Requirements of a Prior Hearing
Recently state welfare officials in New York terminated the
benefits of a welfare recipient on the basis of an erroneous tip
from her landlady that her husband visited her every night. 1 She
requested a posttermination hearing which was provided under
New York law.2 During the four-month delay between the termination of benefits and the hearing, the recipient and her four
small children were evicted from their apartment for nonpayment
of rent. They were forced to move in with the wqman's sister, who
had nine children of her own, and who was also on relief. The recipient's children lost weight and became ill because of lack of
money to buy food. The welfare recipient joined a class action,
Kelly v. Wyman, 3 which challenged the constitutionality of the New
York procedure, alleging that termination of welfare benefits without a prior hearing violates the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Plaintiffs in at least seventeen other states have similarly challenged welfare programs which provide for the termination of benefits without a prior hearing.4
I. Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
2. N.Y. Soc. SERVICES LAW§ 353 (McKinney 1966).
3. 294 F. Supp. 893 (1968).
4. A large number of complaints have been filed demanding the right to a full and
adequate hearing before welfare benefits are terminated. Decisions have been rendered
in the following states: Arizona [Camerena v. Department of Public Welfare, 9 Ariz.
App. 120, 499 P .2d 957 (1969) (prior hearing required)): California [Wheeler v.
Montgomery, 296 F. Supp. 138 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (informal conference with social worker
held to be sufficient); McCullough v. Terzian, No. 379,011 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 2, 1968)
(prior hearing required)): Connecticut [McCall v. Shapiro, 292 F. Supp. 268 (D. Conn.
1968) (prior hearing denied)); Florida Uackson v. Department of Public Welfare, No.
68-568-Civ. (S.D. Fla., dismissed April 23, 1969) (dismissed as moot when benefits were
reinstated)); Georgia [Sprayberry v. Dulaney, No. ll,662 (N.D. Ga., dismissed March 27,
1969) (dismissed when prior hearings were granted voluntarily)); Illinois [Goliday v.
Robinson, No. 69C 73 (N.D. III. Jan. 20, 1969) (temporary restraining order requires
continuation of benefits pending a decision on the merits)]: Iowa [Lage v. Downing,
Civ. No. 7-2089-C-2 (S.D. Iowa, filed Oct. 30, 1968) (three-judge court)); Massachusetts
[Diaz v. Dunn, No. 68,411F (D. Mass., filed May 15, 1968) (benefits continue under new
state regulation until the fair hearing required by regulation of Department of Health,
Education &: Welfare (HEW) takes place); Michigan [Evans v. Houston, No. 105,519
(Mich. Cir. Ct. Jan. 30, 1969) (prior heari11g denied), noted in 17 WELFARE L. BULL. 7
(June 1969); Woodson v. Houston, No. 103,163 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Nov. 12, 1968) (prior
hearing denied); Moore v. Houston, No. 104,435 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Nov. 1, 1968) (consent
judgment)]: Mississippi [Williams v. Gandy, Civ. No. GC 6728 (N.D. Miss., filed June
9, 1967) (welfare benefits must continue pending the HEW fair hearing)): North Carolina [Holt v. Department of Public Welfare, No. C-89-WS-68 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 14, 1968)
(stipulation) (prior hearing required)]: Ohio [Van Blaricum v. Department of Public
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The courts have made various dispositions of this issue ranging
from a holding that no prior hearing is required5 to one that a
trial-type prior hearing must be available on request. 6 In Kelly a
three-judge federal court for the Southern District of New York
upheld the plaintiff's argument that due process requires the availability of a prior hearing, including notice, personal appearance,
disclosure of evidence, confrontation of witnesses, and a decision
by a supervisory official.7 A lower state court in California went
even further and required a trial-type prior hearing. 8 The hearing
called for by that court includes, in addition to the procedural
safeguards required by Kelly, testimony under oath, a record, and
a ·written decision on the record by an impartial referee. 9 By contrast, in Wheeler v. Montgomery, a three-judge federal court for
the Northern District of California held that the opportunity for
an informal conference with a caseworker before termination of
benefits, coupled with a trial-type hearing subsequent to termination, satisfied due process.10 There are other cases, however, which
have held that there is no right at all to a prior hearing.11 The
Supreme Court has consented to hear the Kelly12 and Wheeler18
cases during the present term. The general constitutional problem
raised by those cases concerns the extent to which due process
operates as a limitation on the right of a state to terminate welfare
Welfare, No. 68-78 (S.D. Ohio May 5, 1968) (three-judge court)]; Oregon [Sims v. Juras,
No. 69-238 (D. Ore. April 30, 1969) (three-judge court)]; Pennsylvania [Caldwell v.
Laupheimer, No. 69-397 (E.D. Pa., filed Feb. 24, 1969) (prior hearing required by
stipulation)]; Texas [Machado v. Hackney, Civ. No. 68-108-SA (W.D. Tex. May 12, 1969)
(prior hearing required as a matter of interpretation of state statute)]; Washington
[Bible v. Smith, No. 706,263 (Wash. Super, Ct. March 21, 1969) (preliminary injunction)
(prior hearing required)]; Wisconsin [Miller v. Zoeller, No. 69-C-2 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 20,
1969) (temporary restraining order) (benefits continued pending hearing which subsequently found plaintiff ineligible)].
5. See, e.g., McCall v. Shapiro, 292 F. Supp. 268 (D. Conn. 1968); Woodson v. Houston,
No. 103,163 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Nov. 12, 1968).
6. E.g., McCullough v. Terzian, No. 379,011 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 2, 1968).
7. 294 F. Supp. at 903-06. The opinion was written by Judge Wilfred Feinberg and
concurred in by Judges Frederick vanPelt Bryan and Edward C. McLean.
8. McCullough v. Terzian, No. 379,011 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 2, 1968). For other cases
in which a prior hearing has been required, see note 4 supra.
9. In stating the requirements necessary in a prior hearing, the court applied the
procedural safeguards established by state statute for posttermination hearings. Those
procedural safeguards are specified in CAL. WELF. &: lNSTNs. CODE, §§ 10950-65 (West
1966).
10. 296 F. Supp. 138 (1968). The opinion in that case was a memorandum opinion
entered by Judges O.D. Hamlin, Albert C. Wollenberg, and Alfonso J. Zirpoli. For the
relevant state regulation, see note 23 infra.
11. McCall v. Shapiro, 292 F. Supp. 268 (D. Conn. 1968); Evans v. Houston, No.
105519 (Mich. Cir. CL Jan. 30, 1969), noted in 17 WELFARE L. BULL, 7 ijune 1969);
Woodson v. Houston, No. 103,163 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Nov. 12, 1968).
12. Prob. juris. noted sub. nom. Goldberg v. Kelly, 394 U.S. 971 (1969).
13. Prob. juris. noted, 394 U.S. 970 (1969).
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payments to individual recipients. More specifically, the questions
are whether a full and adequate hearing must be made available
before termination, and if so, what minimum procedural safeguards are required to ensure such a hearing. 14
I. THE

PRESENT STRUCTURE OF WELFARE PROGRAMS

There are two basic types of welfare programs-categorical
assistance and general assistance.15 Categorical assistance programs
are supported by federal grants-in-aid and are administered by the
states according to regulations established by the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare. 16 Those programs include oldage assistance,17 aid to families with dependent children,18 aid to
the blind, 19 and aid to the permanently and totally disabled.20
General assistance, on the other hand, is financed and administered
solely by the state and local governments, and is therefore not
subject to federal regulation. 21
With respect to categorical assistance, the absence of any Supreme Court decision defining the minimum procedural safeguards
prior to termination renders the federal regulations the only nationwide guidelines. The states, of course, could afford the recipient
the needed protection. But most state statutes provide for a "fair"
hearing only after termination, 22 and thus permit the agencies to
14. These issues will be significant even if Congress adopts President Nixon's
proposal that a negative income tax replace many of the present federal welfare pro•
grams, including the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC). His
proposal calls for a "family assistance system" that would guarantee a basic minimum
income to all families in all states but that would also provide an incentive to work
by allowing the "working poor" to keep part of their welfare grants. That system would
be administered by the federal government. See Speech by President Nixon, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 9, 1969, at 1, col. 8. But the proposed system would not eliminate all of the
present programs. For example, programs for aiding the aged, the blind, and the disabled would remain unaffected. Thus, the question whether a prior hearing is
constitutionally compelled would still be important in the administration of those
programs. Moreover, even with respect to the guaranteed minimum income itself, the
constitutional issues presented here would arise, for it is questionable whether those
payments could be terminated or reduced without an adequate hearing.
15. See Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 895-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), prob. juris. noted
sub nom. Goldberg v. Kelly, 394 U.S. 971 (1969); Wedemeyer &: Moore, The American
Welfare System, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 326 (1966); Note, Federal Judicial Review of State
Welfare Practices, 67 CoLUM. L. REv. 84 (1967).
16. 42 u.s.c. § 1302 (1964).
17. Social Security Act tit. I, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-06 (1964).
18. Social Security Act tit. IV, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-09 (1964).
19. Social Security Act tit. X, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1201-06 (1964).
20. Social Security Act tit. XIV, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1351·55 (1964).
21. General assistance includes various home relief programs administered under
state welfare laws. Such programs provide for aid to poor people; unlike categorical
assistance programs, they are not based on particular categories of individuals.
22. State statutes seldom make a clear delineation between procedures to be applied
to categorical assistance progrlUl:ls an.d tlwse to be applied to general assistance. Further,
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cease payments without any sort of adjudicative procedure beforehand. Even in jurisdictions in which the state regulations now call
for an "informal conference" prior to termination,23 the procedure is
inadequate, for it fails to provide many of the safeguards necessary to
satisfy due process.24 Until there is a constitutional decision, then,
federal regulations must be relied on to give a welfare recipient sufficient protection prior to a termination of his grants.
The present regulation of the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare (HEW) requires an informal conference before benefits
are terminated.211 But in at least one county in California, the regulation has not been implemented; 26 and, while actual administrative
practices in other localities are not knmm, various studies have suggested that actual practice deviates significantly from federal requirements. 27 Moreover, it is doubtful that the informal conference
more, actual procedures are often buried in inaccessible administrative regulations.
Nevertheless, the following state statutes are examples of those which provide for a fair
hearing subsequent to the termination of benefits: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.19 (1960):
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 23, § 11·8 (Supp. 1969); !ND• .ANN. STAT. § 52-1211 (1964); IOWA CODE
.ANN. § 239.7 (1969); MAss• .ANN. LAws ch. 118, § 8 (Supp. 1968); MINN. STAT• .ANN.
§ 261.123 (Supp. 1969); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 208.080 (1962).
'\Vhat constitutes a fair hearing, however, is unclear. The state statutes frequently
do not specify the procedural requirements of such a hearing. Thus, a precise definition
of a fair hearing is necessary, and either a federal regulation or a constitutional decision
by the Court could provide that definition.
23. E.g., CAL. STATE DEPT. OF SOCIAL 'WELFARE, PUBUC SERVICES MANUAL, Reg.
44-325.434, provides in pertinent part:
The recipient • • • shall be notified, in writing, immediately upon the initial
decision being made to withhold a warrant beyond its usual delivery date for any
reason other than death, and in no case less than three (3) mail delivery days prior
to the usual delivery date of the warrant to the recipient. • • • Every notification
shall include:
A statement that the recipient ••• may have the opportunity to meet with his
caseworker, an eligibility worker, or another responsible person in the county department, at a specified time, or during a given time period which shall not
exceed three (3) working days, and the last day of which shall be at least one
(1) day prior to the usual delivery date of the warrant, and at a place specifically
designated in order to enable the recipient, parent, or other person:
(a) To learn the nature and extent of the information on which the withholding
action is based;
(b) To provide any explanation or information, including, but not limited to that
described in the notification • • • ;
(c) To discuss the entire matter informally for purposes of clarification and, where
possible, resolution.
24. For a discussion of the minimum procedural safeguards which are required by
due process, see text accompanying notes 107-37 infra. The "informal conference"
clearly does not fulfill all of those conditions.
25. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION &: '\VELFARE, HANDBOOK OF PUBUC ASSISTANCE
ADMINISTRATION pt. IV, § 2300(d)(5) (1967) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
26. See Diaz v. Quitoriano, 74 Cal. Rptr. 358, 361-62 (Ct. App. 1969).
27. Note, Federal Judicial Review of State Welfare Practices, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 84,
91-92 (1967). Another study shows that one welfare department turned some procedural
safeguards into weapons against the recipient. Burrus &: Fessier, Constitutional Due
Process Hearing Requirements in the Administration of Public Assistance: The District
of Columbia Experience, 16 AM. U. L. REv. 199, 212-14 (1967). The paucity of
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which the regulation requires is sufficient to comport with due
process.28
A new HEW regulation, however, which is scheduled to become
effective July 1,- 1970, requires state plans for administering federal
welfare programs to provide that "[w]hen a fair hearing is requested
because of termination ... of assistance, . . . assistance will be continued during the period of the appeal and through the end of the
month in which the final decision on the fair hearing is reached."20
Since that regulation requires that recipients of categorical assistance
be given a fair hearing before their aid can be terminated, it might
appear to moot their constitutional claim for a prior hearing. Both
Wheeler and Kelly involved recipients of categorical assistance, and
thus the forthcoming regulation will probably have a significant
effect on the Supreme Court's decisions in those cases.30 Both are
suits for an injunction to compel the state to furnish a full and adequate hearing before termination of benefits-a result which will
arguably be accomplished by the regulation. Thus, the Court, instead of hearing the constitutional issue, might dismiss or remand
the cases on the grounds that the forthcoming regulation will provide adequate relief. 31 That course of action, it is submitted, would
be a mistake. There are a great many problems with the new regulation, and consequently the constitutional issues, even in the
categorical assistance context, remain crucial.
There is the danger, first of all, that states will not implement
hearings requested and held, even when they should be available, shows that as a
practical matter adequate notice is not given. Comment, Texas Welfare Appeals: The
Hidden Right, 46 TEXAS L. R.Ev. 223 (1967).
28. For a discussion of the requirements of due process, see text accompanying notes
107-65 infra. The informal procedure described in HANDBOOK pt. IV, § 2300(d)(5), lacks
many of those safeguards.
29. 34 Fed. Reg. 1144 (1969). The original effective date of the new regulation was
October I, 1969. But in August, the effective date was moved back to July I, 1970. 34
Fed. Reg. 13,595 (1969). The fair hearing referred to in this regulation is defined and
the safeguards it provides are specified in HANDBOOK pt. IV, §§ 6200-500. For a discussion of some of the defects of the procedure prescribed by the new regulation, sec notes
40-41 infra and accompanying text.
30. The recipient in Wheeler was receiving Old Age Security Assistance, a type of
categorical assistance. In Kelly, although four of the eight plaintiffs received aid under
AFDC, another federal program, the other four were recipients of general assistancehome relief under the New York Social Welfare Law. The new federal regulation will
have no effect on the home relief recipients. See note 50 infra.
31. The Supreme Court has taken similar action before. In Thorpe v. Housing Au•
thority, 393 U.S. 268 (1969), the question was whether a tenant in a subsidized housing
project could be evicted without notice or hearing. While that case was pending
before the Supreme Court, the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) promulgated a regulation providing for both notice and a hearing. The Court
remanded the case for a determination of whether that regulation had retroactive
effect, and, if so, for proceedings consistent with the regulation. See note 66 infra
and accompanying text. Wheeler and Kelly are suits for an injunction and thus the
question of the retroactivity of the HEW regulation is not pertinent to the Court's
decision.
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the regulation. Indeed, some states find it desirable to obtain federal
funds without conforming to federal procedural regulations; 32 those
regulations increase state expense and reduce the discretion of
local welfare officials to terminate benefits. Should states refuse to
implement the new regulation, there may be great difficulty in enforcing it. HEW may be unaware of a failure to conform to its
regulation since its inspection of state and local operations is frequently inadequate.33 That deficiency is compounded by the fact
that dissatisfied recipients cannot call attention to any failure to
conform since they have no right to appeal directly to HEW.34 If
the Supreme Court should decide that an adequate prior hearing is
constitutionally required, however, states would probably be more
willing to follow that direct requirement.
Secondly, if the Court avoids the constitutional issue, it will be
difficult for a welfare recipient to secure a court order for a pretermination hearing. Without a constitutional decision, the present
inconsistency among lower courts will remain-some will say that
there is a constitutional right and will grant relief, and others will
deny the right altogether.35 The new federal regulation will not cure
that inconsistency, because nation-wide compliance with the regulation cannot be judicially enforced. Federal welfare regulations are
administrative directives addressed solely to state agencies, and do
not grant substantive rights to individuals.36 Thus, under the new
federal regulation, there is no right to a prior hearing, and a recipient who bases his claim solely on that regulation may be unable to
obtain relief in either a state or a federal court. Although some states
have incorporated the regulation into state law, thereby giving the
recipients a right to judicial enforcement of it in state courts, that
course of action is by no means universally available.37
Accordingly, in many instances, the sole means of forcing the
states to provide a pretermination hearing is for the federal government to withold funds. But that course of action has had an ex32. See note 27 supra and text accompanying note 47 infra.
33. See Wedemeyer&: Moore, The American Welfare System, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 326,
340 (1966).
34. Note, Federal Judicial Review of State Welfare Practices, 67 COLUM. L. REY.
84, 91 (1967),
35. See notes 4-10 supra and accompanying text.
36. Moreover, since state participation in categorical assistance programs is voluntary,
recipients have no right to federal welfare money. McCall v. Shapiro, 292 F. Supp. 268,
276 (D. Conn. 1968).
37. Note, Federal Judicial Review of State Welfare Practices, 67 COLUM. L. REY.
84, 95 (1967). The federal regulation defining fair hearing specifically acknowledges
that judicial review of Welfare decisions is unavailable in some states, and it does not
purport to change this rule. HANDBOOK. pt. IV, § 6400(i); cf. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S.
386 (1947) (holding that state courts have a duty to enforce a claim under federal
statute which specifically provides for jurisdiction in state courts).
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tremely adverse effect on welfare recipients, and has therefore seldom
been applied. 38 Moreover, since 1965, states have had the right to
judicial review of decisions to withhold funds. 39 That right reduces
the negotiating leverage which the threatened withholding of federal
funds would otherwise have and prolongs the possible duration of
non-conformity.
But if the Supreme Court should decide that a pretermination
hearing is constitutionally required, a wider range of remedies would
be available. Since there would be a constitutional mandate for a
prior hearing, recipients would be able to secure enforcement of
that mandate in either a state or a federal court, and reliance on the
federal regulation would be unnecessary. The recipient's ready access to the courts, in tum, would make a state's continued failure to
conform to the constitutional standard easier to remedy.
Even if state adherence to the forthcoming regulation could be
effectively enforced, a constitutional decision is necessary. As will
be shown later, the fair hearing which the regulation provides
does not specifically include all of the minimum procedural safeguards required by the Constitution.40 The regulation defining
fair hearing does have a saving clause making the hearing "subject to the requirements of due process,"41 but that clause will
become operative only when there is an explicit constitutional decision as to what safeguards due process requires.
Finally, the new federal regulation is subject to modification or
revocation. Since the regulation was promulgated by a lame-duck,
Democratic administration, 42 such action seems likely. Indeed, the
present Republican administration has expressed dissatisfaction
with the costly procedures of the welfare system and has proposed
that a major part of the system be eliminated in favor of a negative
income tax. 43 If Congress should adopt that proposal, the HE'\,V
regulation, which applies only to existing welfare programs, would
lose much of its effectiveness. Yet the same constitutional issues
concerning the necessity for a prior hearing would remain with re38. Wedemeyer & Moore, The American Welfare System, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 326, 342
(1966); Note, Federal Judicial Review of State Welfare Practices, 67 CoLUM. L. REv. 84,
91 (1967).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1316 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
40. The fair hearing procedure, as defined in HANDBOOK pt. IV, §§ 6200-500,
contains insufficient notice of the opportunity for a hearing, and it fails to include the
right of recipients to confront adverse witnesses. It therefore fails to provide minimum,
constitutionally required procedural safeguards. See text accompanying notes 107-37
infra.
41. HANDBOOK pt. IV, § 6400(a).
42. The regulation was approved January 17, 1969, by the outgoing Democratic
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Wilbur J. Cohen. 34 Fed. Reg. 1144 (1969).
43. See Speech by President Nixon, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1969, at I, col. 8.
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spect to the termination of the negative tax payments.44 Even if
Congress does not adopt the proposal, the HEW regulation creating
more expensive procedures may be changed or withdrawn at the
discretion of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. Thus,
since the regulation, even before it goes into effect, faces a potential revocation, 45 the necessity for a consideration of the constitutional
issues, even in the categorical assistance context, is obvious.
The constitutional questions are even more significant £or
general assistance. General assistance programs are administered
solely by the state and local governments and are thus not governed
by federal regulations. There are, moreover, a substantial number
of people affected by those programs. In 1968, for example, 749,000
people received benefits under them.46 Procedures are fixed by
state administrative directives and local ordinances, and those procedures are often in sharp conflict with federal standards.47 In
fact, before the current flood of constitutional challenges, only one
state had a general provision £or a prior hearing,48 and even that
provision was not generally accepted.49 Thus, even if the forthcoming HEW regulation is found to moot the constitutional issues in
the categorical assistance context, the same issues are alive and important with respect to general assistance. Because of their importance in these circumstances, the Supreme Court, confronted with
the constitutional issues in both Wheeler and Kelly, should take the
opportunity to decide them. 50

II.

THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE .APPLIES TO THE
TERMINATION OF WELFARE BENEFITS

Although the Supreme Court has not expressly held that the
requirement of procedural fairness contained in the due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments is applicable to the
44. See note 14 supra.
45. In fact, under the Nixon administration, the effective date of the forthcoming
regulation has already been changed from October I, 1969, to July I, 1970. See note 29
supra.
46. U.S. Dept. of Health, Education & Welfare, Program and Operating Statistics
for Public Assistance in April-May 1968, WELFARE IN REvrnw 22, 43 (Sept.-Oct. 1968).
47. See note 27 supra.
·18. 3 l\lISS. DEPT. OF PUBLIC WELFARE, MANUAL § F, at 6102.
49. Williams v. Gandy, Civ. No. GC 6728 (N.D. Miss., filed June 9, 1967), noted in
Ill WELFARE L. BULL. 7 aune 1968).
50. Indeed, in the Kelly case, four of the original plaintiffs had general assistance
benefits terminated without a prior heating. Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 896
(S.D,N.Y. 1968), prob. juris. noted sub nom. Goldberg v. Kelly, 394 U.S. 971 (1969).
Their suits remain unaffected by the new federal regulation, and so the Court's disposition of them must be on constitutional grounds.
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termination of welfare benefits, its prior decisions suggest that
such a holding is likely.51 For the due process clause to apply, there
must be both state action and a deprivation of "life, liberty, or
property" or of some other individual interest of sufficient importance to warrant constitutional protection. Since the termination
of welfare benefits clearly involves state action,52 the only significant question here is whether it deprives individual recipients of
a protected right.
It can be argued that recipients have no vested property right
to regularly recurring subsistence grants, 153 and that therefore procedural due process is not relevant to the termination of welfare
benefits. Welfare payments, the argument runs, are merely an exercise of governmental largesse and may be summarily terminated.
According to that argument, since the legislature has the undisputed
power to vote the entire state welfare program out of existence,5i
it can set any restrictions it desires on that program without calling
into play the due process clause.
This contention, however, is not persuasive. Indeed, there are
three distinct explanations for the applicability of the due process
clause in the welfare situation. The first is that, while welfare recipients probably do not have a "vested" property right to a continued stream of benefits, 55 they do have a statutory right to those
benefits so long as they are qualified. Arguably, welfare statutes
confer a "property right" to continued benefits, under a somewhat
expanded definition of that term. 56 Since the legislatures have provided welfare benefits on a large scale to a well-defined class of
recipients within a regular institutional framework, 157 those benefits
are clearly not granted as special favors to particular individuals.
A welfare recipient would have no right to be free from hardship
if the legislature did not appropriate funds for welfare. But, ac51. To say that the due process clause is applicable does not necessarily mean that a
hearing prior to termination is constitutionally required. But it is only after that
clause is found to apply to the termination of welfare benefits that the question of
what due process requires prior to termination can be properly considered.
52. See Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 386 U.S. 670, 678-79 (1967) Gustice Douglas,
concurring).
53. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960) (holding that the Government may
deprive a recipient of old-age benefits even though the recipient and his employer have
made contributions over the years to qualify for those benefits).
54. Cf. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
55. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
56. See Graham, Public Assistance: The Right To Receive; The Obligation To
Repay, 43 N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 451 (1968); Morris, Welfare Benefits as Property: Requiring a
Prior Hearing, 20 AD. L. R.Ev. 487 (1968); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733
(1964); Smith, Public Assistance as a Social Obligation, 63 HARV. L. R.Ev. 266 (1949).
57. Cf. Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert-Counsel in the Peno-Correctional
Process, 45 MINN. L. RE\'. 803, 826-27 (1961).
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cording to this explanation, once the welfare recipient has the
prima fade characteristics of the class to which the legislature has
given benefits, he has a statutory right to some measure of procedural protection. Commentators making this argument are quite
sensitive to the brutal impact of terminating the benefits of an
eligible recipient and recommend an expansion of the concept
of property rights only to promote full and adequate procedural
safeguards in that situation. 58
The second explanation is that the government must abide by
fundamental principles of fairness even when dispensing a privilege. It has been held that the recipient of governmental aidwhether unemployment compensation, 59 a license to practice law,60
or free education61-is entitled to the protection of the due process
clause, even if the aid is considered a privilege. The same principle
would appear to apply in the case of welfare benefits.62
The third explanation-the one favored by the Supreme Court63
-looks at the importance of the individual interests at stake without attempting to classify them as "life," "liberty," or "property,"
or as rights as opposed to privileges. Under this approach, the due
process clause is applicable whenever the state deals with the individual, as long as the individual interests are not frivolous. Since
an erroneous termination of welfare benefits may deprive the recipient of necessary food and medicine, the individual's interests
are hardly frivolous. Therefore, the due process clause is rightfully
invoked, and a constitutional question is raised as to whether due
process requires a full and adequate hearing prior to termination.

III.

DuE PROCESS REQUIRES A FuLL AND ADEQUATE HEARING
PRIOR TO THE TERMINATION OF WELFARE BENEFITS

Once the due process clause is found to be applicable, the crucial
question is whether it requires a full and adequate hearing prior
58. See note 56 supra.
59. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
60. Willner v. Committee on Character&: Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963).
61. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 930 (1961).
62. The weakness of this explanation is that a substantial constitutional question
as to whether a hearing is required would be posed in nearly every situation in which
the government deals with the individual. That result is not always desirable. In some
cases the claimed right to a hearing will be clearly frivolous, and the courts should
waste a minimum amount of time disposing of it. For instance, if the President
dismisses the Secretary of State, the government's interest in being able to dismiss that
employee without giving reasons so clearly outweighs the individual's interest in not
being arbitrarily removed from his job that the claimed right to a hearing should
be dismissed without a trial of the issues. The same rule should apply whenever the
balance of interests is tipped very heavily in favor of the government. See text accompanying note 63 infra.
63. See, e.g., Cafeteria &: Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
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to the termination of welfare benefits. Procedural due process is a
flexible requirement which depends upon "[t]he precise nature of
the interest that has been adversely affected, the manner in which
this was done, the reasons for doing it, the available alternatives to
the procedure which was followed, ... and the balance of the hurt
complained of and good accomplished . . . ." 64 In applying that
balancing test to the question at issue, the probable damage .to
individual interests resulting from an erroneous termination of
benefits must be balanced against the government's interest in
summary procedures. If the recipient's interest outweighs the government's, he cannot constitutionally be deprived of his welfare
payments without a prior hearing.
The Supreme Court has not yet had occasion to apply the
balancing test in the welfare assistance context. In a similar case,
Thorpe v. Housing Authority,65 in which the question was whether
a tenant in a subsidized housing project could be evicted without
notice and a hearing, the Court did require a prior hearing. But
it based its decision in that case on a federal regulation, and specifically reserved the due process question. 66
64. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 (1951) ijustice
Frankfurter, concurring). Compare the standard applied in Cafeteria &: Restaurant
Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961): "Consideration of what procedures
due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the
private interest that has been affected by governmental action." In Willner v. Committee on Character &: Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963), the Supreme Court weighed the
interests of the government and the individual in its determination that due process
requires the confrontation of adverse character witnesses before an individual can be
excluded from the practice of law.
This approach, however, is not without critics. One commentator argues that the
process of weighing interests requires the courts to canvass "a host of variables in a
quasi-legislative fashion on the strength of a barely adequate record .•••" Van Alstyne,
The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv.
1439, 1447-48 (1968). Nevertheless, that commentator is obviously in agreement with the
extension of the right to a hearing-a result which the balancing approach has wrought
in this instance. In fact, he argues that it would be desirable to have an absolute right
to a hearing which would extend to all situations. Id. at 1454. But there are some
instances in which a hearing is clearly undesirable. One example Davis uses is the
removal of the Secretary of State by the President. I K. DAVIS, Am,UNISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE 454 (1958); see note 62 supra. Thus, since no absolute rule can be applied, the
use of the weighing process is inevitable. Davis states:
The true principle is that a party who has a sufficient interest or right at stake
in a determination of governmental action should be entitled to an opportunity
to know and to meet, with the weapons of rebuttal evidence, cross-examination, and
argument, unfavorable evidence of adjudicative facts, except in the rare circumstances when some other interest, such as national security, justifies an overriding
of the interest in fair hearing.
·
1 K. DAVIS, supra, at 412.
65. 393 U.S. 268 (1969).
66. When the case came before the Supreme Court, the Court remanded it with
instructions that the state court was to determine whether a new HUD directive providing for notice and a hearing had retroactive effect. Thorpe v. Housing Authority,
386 U.S. 670 (1967). The state court held that the directive did not apply, but the
Supreme Court at a second hearing held that it did. 393 U.S. 268 (1969). Thus, the due
process question was avoided.
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There are numerous decisions, however, concerning the constitutional necessity for a hearing before the termination of licenses,67
the expulsion of students from state colleges, 68 the loss of federal
employment,60 and the deportation of aliens. 70 Those cases can
be distinguished from that of the termination of welfare benefits
because they involved considerations of detrimental reliance and, in
some cases, national defense-considerations not found in the welfare situation. 71 But even though those cases cannot be controlling as
to whether a hearing is required prior to the termination of welfare benefits, they can be used to determine what interests have
been considered important in the balancing process.
A common feature of the cases was the nature of the facts which
the hearing was designed to establish. Each decision involved facts
peculiar to the individual-which Professor Kenneth Culp Davis
calls "adjudicative facts"-as opposed to facts determining general
policy decisions-which he calls "legislative facts." 72 In those cases,
the individual was the best source of information, and was in the
67. As early as 1926, the Supreme Court declared in dictum that admission to practice as an accountant could not be denied on the basis of character unfitness without a
hearing. Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117. In 1963, the Court held that
before a state may exclude an individual from the practice of law for character unfitness,
there must be an opportunity for confrontation of adverse witnesses. Willner v. Committee on Character &: Fitness, 373 U.S. 96. The admission-to-practice cases are part
of a general class of cases involving state licensing. In 1964, the Fifth Circuit held that
a liquor license could be denied without a hearing. Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F .2d 605.
These cases all require a hearing and thus lend support to the argument that a hearing
is required in welfare cases.
68, Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 9l!O (1961) (student in state college cannot be expelled for misconduct without a
hearing).
69. Cafeteria&: Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961); Greene
v. McElroy, l!60 U.S. 474 (1959).
70. Shaughnessy v. Mezei, l!45 U.S. 206 (1953); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S.
590 (1953); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
71. In the admission-to-practice cases, the effort it takes to complete law school and
to pass the bar examination constitutes detrimental reliance on the objectivity of government licensing. An arbitrary denial of the right to practice law at this point is
palpably unfair. In the termination of other types of licenses, there is usually detrimental reliance on the fairness of termination proceedings. That reliance frequently
involves business expenses such as advertising and nonsaleable investments. In obtaining
welfare benefits, however, there is no detrimental reliance in most states. But there are
exceptions. In Illinois, for example, an AFDC recipient must dispose of all assets in
excess of one month's welfare benefits before qualifying. BURE.Au OF FAMILY SERVICES,
U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION &: WELFAltE, CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE Ptmuc AsSISTANCE PLANS UNDER THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT, GENERAL PROVISIONS 116 (Public
Assistance Report No. 50, 1964). Similarly, in Florida, before aid may be paid, court
actions for support must be prosecuted against anyone who may be liable for support.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.182 (1960).
With regard to the student expulsion cases, the same type of detrimental reliance
described above distinguishes a state subsidy to a student's education from a state
subsidy to pay for food and housing. The federal employment cases are dominated by
national security issues which are not found in welfare cases. Finally, the deportation
decisions raise i5"UCS such as national defense and the breaking up of family unityissues not found in welfare cases.
72, l ADIIUNISTMTIVE LAW TREATISE 412•15 (1958).
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best position to rebut opposing information, about facts such as
his own character, 73 his conduct in college,74 or his connections with
the Communist Party.75 The courts held that, because such adjudicative facts were involved, the state was required to furnish a
hearing before it could act.76
The termination of welfare benefits also generally involves adjudicative facts. The welfare recipient, typically a woman, is the
best source of information about her income, the presence of a
man in the house, and other factors determining eligibility. "Legislative facts" in the welfare situatidn might include a change in the
cost-of-living index leading to an across-the-board increase in benefits,
or another change in the general rules of eligibility; with respect to
those facts the individual recipient would have no right to a hearing.
But these situations are not at issue here. Thus, it appears from an
examination of the available precedents that when the situation involves adjudicative facts, as it does in termination of welfare benefits, the courts tend to give decisive weight to the individual interests and to require a hearing.
In applying the balancing test directly to the welfare situation,
the individual's interest in having an adequate hearing prior to
termination must be weighed against the public interest in conserving tax revenues. It is important, at the outset, to characterize
the hardship suffered by a recipient who is not afforded a pretermination hearing. The Supreme Court has held that if the hardship
is a mere "inconvenience," it weighs lightly in the balance; 77 but
if it involves a substantial monetary loss and a change in living
standards, then it weighs more heavily. 78 When the hardship has
had an adverse effect on health, and when it has approached a
deprivation of life, it has usually been controlling.79
73. Willner v. Committee on Character 8e Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963).
74. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 930 (1961).
75. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
76. In only one case of those listed above was a hearing not required. Cafeteria
8e Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961). But there the Govern•
ment had a special interest in the security of a naval base.
77. When a short-order cook is excluded from the employment of only one partic•
ular employer, the interest harmed does not weigh heavily. Cafeteria &: Restaurant
Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
78. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
79. Numerous cases have permitted spoiled or mislabeled food to be seized without
a hearing. Ewing v. Mytinger &: Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (permitting summary seizure of allegedly mislabeled food); North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of
Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) (permitting summary destruction of food reasonably thought
to be spoiled). Since property cannot normally be seized without a hearing, the public
interest in health weighed heavily in reaching those decisions. The possibility that an
erroneous termination of benefits may affect the health of the individual recipient may
be analyzed in two ways. The individual has an interest in protecting his own
health. But also there is a public interest in protecting public health, and that interest
requires protecting the health of each individual. Since the threat to health in welfare
cases is the result of state action rather than private action, the case for protecting
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In the situation at hand, it is clear that the hardship suffered by
a welfare recipient whose grants are wrongfully terminated is
substantial. In the Kelly case, for example, an erroneous termination of welfare benefits, coupled with the four-month delay before
the error was corrected, resulted in the crowding of thirteen children
and two adults into a small apartment where the children lost
weight and became ill from lack of food. 80 In the same case, another
of the plaintiffs, along with her family, "had to go to the hospital
for severe diarrhea, apparently brought on by the only meal they
had had that day-spoiled chick~n and rice donated by a neighbor."81 In TVheeler, after an erroneous termination of welfare
benefits, plaintiff lacked food, medicine, and other necessities.82
These examples are by no means unusual or unrepresentative. In
Kelly the Court found that only fifty of seventy-eight cases during
a five-month period were affirmed in posttermination hearings; 83
and in Wheeler it was stated that California's own eligibility control
unit had found that aid to five to eight per cent of all recipients
was erroneously terminated, while aid to only one per cent of
recipients was erroneously continued.84 The four-month delay
before reinstatement was also typical.85 Thus, in a substantial
number of cases, welfare recipients had benefits wrongfully withheld for a long period of time. The resulting hardship frequently
involved adverse effects upon the health of the recipients or, at
least, a substantial reduction in their standard of living. 86
health, whether considered a private interest, a public interest, or both, is even stronger
than it was in the spoiled food situation.
80. Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 899 (1968), prob. juris. noted sub nom.
Goldberg v. Kelly, 394- U.S. 971 (1969).
81. Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 899 (1968), prob. juris. noted sub nom.
Goldberg v. Kelly, 394 U.S. 971 (1969). The same plaintiff, while seeking emergency aid,
fainted in the welfare center because she had not eaten for an entire day.
82. Jurisdictional Statement for Appellant at 4, Wheeler v. Montgomery, 394 U.S.
970 (1969).
83. Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), prob. juris. noted sub nom.
Goldberg v. Kelly, 394 U.S. 971 (1969). In California only 65% of posttermination
hearings decided between July 1, 1968, and March 30, 1969, resulted in an affirmation
of the decision to terminate benefits. CAL. DEPT. OF SOCIAL WELFARE, SUMMARY OF ALL
F.\lR HEARING DECISlONS, cited in Brief for Appellant at 13, Wheeler v. Montgomery,
prob. juris. noted, 394 U.S. 970 (1969). In Texas, the percentage was even lower. There,
affirmations in posttermination hearings of decisions to terminate benefits averaged
only 49% from 1958 to 1966. Comment, Texas Welfare Appeals: The Hidden Right, 46
TEXAS L. REv. 223, 224 (1967). See also Comment, Eligibility Determinations in Public
Assistance: Selected Problems and Proposals for Reform in Pennsylvania, 115 U. PA.
L. REV. 1307, 1312-13 (1967).
84. Cal. Dept. of Social Welfare, Circular Letter No. 2064, Nov. 1967 (R. 157-162),
cited in Brief for Appellant at 12, Wheeler v. Montgomery, prob. juris. noted, 394 U.S.
970 (1969).
85. Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), prob. juris. noted sub nom.
Goldberg v. Kelly, 394 U.S. 971 (1969). In the Wheeler case, there was more than a
four-month delay between the erroneous termination of benefits and reinstatement.
Jurisdictional Statement for Appellant at 4, Wheeler v. Montgomery, 394 U.S. 970 (1969).
86. A consideration which has been important in other cases is the degree of oppro-
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If that hardship is to be eliminated, there must be a procedure
for correcting erroneous decisions without a delay. The posttermination hearing which is provided by most states has proven inadequate for that purpose. In both Kelly and Wheeler, the welfare
procedures required a prompt hearing on a request after termination of benefits.87 Yet in both cases, the states involved averaged a
four-month delay before posttermination hearings were completed.88
Once benefits are terminated there is no incentive for welfare
officials to be prompt. The practical solution seems to be a requirement that a full and adequate hearing be available prior to
termination of welfare benefits. 89 Thus, the individual recipients
appear to possess a very strong interest in having the right to such
a hearing. 00
brium resulting from administrative action. In the termination of welfare benefits,
the recipient is often alleged to be an unfit mother or to have engaged in "immoral"
conduct. This type of label must be damaging to the pride and reputation of a poor
person who has done nothing wrong. The impact may not be as great as being labeled
a "Communist" or a "security risk," but it should be considered. Cf. Greene v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 474 (1959); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886
(1961).
87. Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), prob. juris. noted mb
nom. Goldberg v. Kelly, 394 U.S. 971 (1969). Jurisdictional Statement for Appellant
at 4a, Wheeler v. Montgomery, 394 U.S. 970 (1969).
88. See note 85 supra.
89. The case law on the issue of the timing of hearings involves analogies which
are not close enough to be considered controlling in a welfare case. Furthermore, in
most of those cases, the primary issue was whether any hearing was required, and the
issue of timing was only incidental to an affirmative answer. For instance, the Supreme
Court has held that a resident alien cannot be deported without a hearing prior to
deportation. However, the Court has not squarely faced the issue of whether a resident
alien may be detained pending a deportation hearing when there is no immediate risk
to national security. Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); Kwong Hai Chew
v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
Often the timing of the hearing is not crucial. For instance, in the case of the
expulsion of a student from a state college, it does not cause great harm if the student
is suspended for a few days pending a hearing. Indeed, that procedure is permitted.
Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968);
Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967); Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228
(S.D. W. Va.), affd., 399 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1968). But a hearing must be held before
a permanent suspension. Woods v. Wright, 334 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1964); Knight v. State
Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (1:f.D. Tenn. 1961). Only when there has been an effect
on health and the possibility of a permanent injury has the issue of timing assumed
importance. Food reasonably thought to be spoiled may be seized and destroyed before
a hearing is held. North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 2Il U.S. 306 (1908).
A doctor's surgical privileges at a state hospital may be suspended when the safety of
patients is in jeopardy. Coach v. State, 165 S.2d 426 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964). But when
the threat to health is doubtful, and the grounds of the doctor's suspension would
result in a permanent loss of reputation, a prior hearing is required. Birnbaum
v. Trussell, 371 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1966).
90. If welfare recipients could be divided into various classes according to the
degree of hardship suffered when benefits are erroneously terminated, different require•
ments might be proposed for different classes. For instance, if a state were to grant
supplemental benefits to provide special education for disadvantaged families, a hearing
could, without causing hardship, be postponed until after benefits were terminated.
However, welfare benefits are usually granted only to maintain a minimum standard
of living and, therefore, the procedural requirements applied to most welfare programs
should be uniform.
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The governmental interests, on the other hand, are slight. Of
course, the requirement of a prior hearing would increase the government's expenses to some extent. Since a request for such a
hearing would temporarily suspend the termination of welfare benefits, there would be an increased incentive for recipients to make that
request even if they knew they were not qualified. During the period
between the request for a hearing and the hearing itself, the government would incur the expense of continuing benefits-an expense that could not be recouped. 91
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has held in numerous cases
that when the interest in reducing expenses and in conserving tax
revenues is the sole justification for a denial of procedural protection, that interest is not entitled to any weight in the constitutional
balancing process.92 Moreover, although the continuation of benefits until after a hearing is likely to be much more expensive than
is the posttermination mechanism provided in most states,93 it does
not necessarily have to be so. Under the New York procedure described in the Kelly case, the welfare recipient received a notice of
proposed termination seven days before benefits were actually
terminated.94 It is possible that, with more personnel and increased
efficiency, a requested hearing could be completed within those
seven days. I£ so, there would be no extra incentive to request
hearings and no added expense from continuing benefits. In addition, there are other possible ways to reduce the costs of a pretermination hearing. 95 The forthcoming federal regulation, which
will make prior hearings available on request, indicates that many
governmental officials themselves have found that such a requirement is not too burdensome.
The state also has an interest in paying benefits only to those
who meet the statutory requirements. 96 That interest, however,
91. Graham, Public Assistance: The Right To Receive; The Obligation To Repay,
43 N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 451, 496 (1968). It can be argued, too, that the government's interest
in reducing those expenses is shared by welfare recipients. If the state's welfare budget
is fixed, regardless of the cost of administration, the added procedural expense will
decrease the actual paid benefits. But if that assumption is correct, the entire state
interest in conserving tax revenues is eliminated.
92•. Willner v. Committee on Character 8: Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963); Cafeteria
8: Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961); Greene v. McElroy, 360
U.S. 474 (1959); Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926).
93. See text accompanying notes 166-67 infra.
94. Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), prob. juris. noted sub
nom. Goldberg v. Kelly, 39-! U.S. 971 (1969).
95. See, e.g., the proposals in note 169 infra. In one respect, the New York and
California procedures may be more expensive than that required by due process.
The present hearing in those states is a trial-type proceeding with special hearing
examiners and a formal record. As will be shown later, due process requires only a
procedure that is somewhere between summary termination and a trial-type hearing.
See text accompanying notes 108-24 infra. That less formal procedure, then, would
eliminate some of the existing costs in those states.
96. Evidence is accumulating that fair procedure is important in preventing further
alienation of the people living in ghettoes:
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cuts both ways. On the one hand, the prior hearing rule means
that some individuals will continue to receive benefits for a short
period of time even though they are no longer qualified. But on the
other hand, it will probably reduce the number of erroneous terminations and thus promote the governmental interest. Furthermore, the objection to the prior hearing requirement should not
carry much weight. A person who continues to receive benefits
until the hearing is either still in actual need of welfare, or is
barely self-sufficient.97 Thus, it is clearly preferable that the error
be the continuance of benefits for a short period of time to unqualified individuals who request a hearing than that the mistake
be the termination of the benefits of individuals who are actually
qualified.
Thus, the governmental interests in preventing an adequate
prior hearing are entitled to very little weight. Indeed, on close
examination, they are somewhat ambiguous-increased procedural
protection yields both costs and benefits to the state. In the interest
balancing which determines the requirements of due process, the
interest of the individual in having the right to a hearing in order
to avoid, as surely as possible, the brutal hardship of an erroneous
termination of benefits outweighs the states' interests in conserving
tax revenues and in avoiding erroneous payments. Due process,
therefore, requires a full and adequate hearing prior to the termination of welfare benefits.98

IV.

THE MINIMUM PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS OF THE FULL AND
ADEQUATE PRIOR HEARING REQUIRED BY DUE PROCESS

There are nvo basic ways to meet the constitutional requirement. One is to initiate a new hearing, fully comporting with the
minimum due process safeguards,99 prior to the termination of
Negroes, like people in poverty everywhere, in fact lack the channels of communication, influence, and appeal that traditionally have been available to ethnic
minorities within the city and which enabled them-unburdened by color-to scale
the walls of the white ghettos in an earlier era. The frustrations of powerlessness
have led some to the conviction that there is no effective alternative to violence
as a means of expression and redress, as a way of "moving the system."
U.S. NATIONAL ADVISORY CoMMN. ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT 92 (1968) (Kerner Commn.
Report).
97. In Illinois, for example, an AFDC recipient, before qualifying, must dispose of
all assets in excess of one month's welfare benefits. If benefits are erroneously tcr•
minated, the family will become destitute within a short period of time. BUREAU OF
FAMILY SERVICES, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, supra note 71, at 116.
98. See Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1968):
Against the justified desire to protect public funds must be weighed the individual's
••• need in this unique situation not to be wrongfully deprived of assistance, and
the startling statistic that post-termination fair hearings apparently override prior
decisions to terminate benefits in a substantial number of cases. . • • The • • •
obvious remedy is to take greater care to prevent such injustice before it occurs.
• • • Under all the circumstances, we hold that due process requires an adequate
hearing before termination of welfare benefits . • • •
99. Those safeguards are defined in the text accompanying notes 107-65 infra.
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benefits, or to develop an existing pretermination conference, such
as that provided in California,100 into a full and adequate hearing.
Such a procedure would make the original posttermination fair hearing unnecessary. The other approach-that adopted by the forthcoming federal regulation-is to utilize the posttermination fair hearing
mechanism that exists in most states, that is, to provide for the continuation of benefits until the original fair hearing has been completed.101 Under this approach, the existence of a prior informal
conference is irrelevant to the constitutional requirement, although
such a conference may be helpful in practical terms. 102
Whether a new procedure is instituted or an existing fair hearing mechanism is used, the hearing prior to termination, in order
to be adequate and effective and thus to satisfy the requirements
of due process,103 must protect the recipient, with as much certainty
as is possible, against an arbitrary and erroneous termination of
his benefits. To do this, it must contain certain minimum procedural safeguards calculated to insure an accurate determination.
Without those safeguards, a hearing is meaningless. As will be
shown, the fair hearing, which, under the forthcoming federal
regulation, must precede termination, is, on its face, constitutionally
insufficient.104 But the constitutional infirmity is easily cured since
the regulation defining fair hearing contains a clause stating that,
despite the informal nature of the hearing described, "the hearing
is to be subject to the requirements of due process."105 Thus, if
there is a decision as to what safeguards due process compels,1° 6 the
fair hearing provided in the regulation will become constitutionally
sufficient.
The procedural safeguards required by due process in welfare
termination proceedings must be adapted to the particular characteristics of welfare recipients, and to the special nature of the
determination being made.107 There is the danger of a too literal
100. See note 23 supra.
IOI. It has been argued that the existence of a posttermination fair hearing reduces
the procedural safeguards required in the prior hearing. See Wheeler v. Montgomery,
296 F. Supp. 138, 140 (N.D. Cal. 1968). That argument suggests that some erroneous
terminations should be tolerated in the prior hearing because they may be corrected
in the posttermination hearing. It must be rejected for the same considerations which
led to a requirement of a prior hearing in the first place.
102. See the discussion of Professor Wickham's proposal in note 169 infra.
103. A hearing which is not effective to adjudicate fairly whether the recipient is
qualified could hardly be said to fulfill the constitutional requirement of an adequate
prior hearing.
104. The procedural safeguards provided in the fair hearing are described in
HANDBOOK pt. IV, §§ 6200-500. The deficiencies in that fair hearing are the failure
to provide for oral notice of the opportunity for a hearing, and the failure to provide
for confrontation of adverse witnesses. See text accompanying notes 126-28, 133 infra.
105. HANDBOOK pt. IV, § 6400(a).
106. The Supreme Court could make that decision in Wheeler or Kelly. See text
accompanying notes 40-41 supra.
107. It is clear that due process requirements vary according to the circumstances
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transposition of specific procedural safeguards from other contexts
to this one. The controlling legal principle is that the hearing must
be meaningful; 108 it must afford a reasonable opportunity to correct error.100 In that determination some safeguards, such as adequate notice and the right to a personal appearance, are clearly
necessary.110 Others, however, such as a ·written record or the right
to counsel, are less clear.111 The discussion in this section will focus
on the specific constitutional requirements which are the minimum
for a full and adequate prior hearing.
A primary safeguard necessary to satisfy due process is that of
adequate notification. The right to a prior hearing can hardly be
meaningful unless the individual realizes that he has that right. In
order for a hearing to be constitutionally sufficient, then, welfare
recipients whose benefits are to be terminated must be notified of
the opportunity for a hearing. But effective communication to a
recipient that he has a right to such a hearing presents troublesome
problems. One study shows that welfare recipients are reluctant to
request and attend hearings on their own initiative.112 Even when
they have received an oral explanation of the right to a hearing,
they rarely exercise that right.113 There are many causes for this
reluctance. The welfare recipient may be illiterate; 114 he may not
understand how to obtain a hearing; 115 he may regard welfare as
and must be adapted to the particular situation. Cafeteria 8e Restaurant Workers Union
v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960);
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 Gustice Frankfurter,
concurring). For cases in which trial-type hearings have been deemed unnecessary,
see Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963); Dixon
v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930
(1961).
108. A fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard, "at
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552
(1965).
109. Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407, 415 (1955). Compare another formulation of the same standard: the hearing must provide "the protection of the individual
against arbitrary action." Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm., 301 U.S. 292, !102
(1937), cited in Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 386 U.S. 670, 678 (1967) CTustice Douglas,
concurring).
ll0. See text accompanying notes 112-33 infra.
lll. See text accompanying notes 140-65 infra.
ll2. Briar, Welfare from Below: Recipients' Views of the Public Welfare System,
54 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 370, 379-80 (1966).
ll3. Id. The very low proportion of cases in which hearings have been requested
is evidence of the communication problem. Out of 141,286 Texas welfare recipients
who were denied assistance or who had their grants lowered or terminated in 1966,
only- 693 filed appeals. Comment, Texas Welfare Appeals: The Hidden Right, 46
TEXAS L. R.Ev. 223 (1967).
114. Only 57% of welfare mothers in New York City reached high school; only one
of six graduated; and one of six did not get beyond the fourth grade. Cox, Families
on Welfare in New York City, 6 WELFARE IN REVIEW 22, 24 (1968).
ll5. Briar, Welfare from Below: Recipients' Views of the Public Welfare System,
54 CAI.IF. L. REv. 370, 376 (1966).
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charity and not realize that it may be asserted as a right; 116 he may
believe that requesting a hearing would damage his interests by
angering the social worker; 117 or he may be afraid to attend the
hearing. 118 Thus, the welfare agency has a duty under the Constitution to make a reasonable effort to see to it that the recipients
understand their right to a hearing.
Because of the widespread illiteracy and related problems, a
standard written notice is usually insufficient,119 At a minimum,
the right to a hearing should be explained to the recipient at the initial granting of benefits and at periodic re-evaluations. When benefits are to be terminated, the social worker, in addition to sending
written notice, should telephone or visit the recipient and should
carefully explain to him his procedural and substantive rights. If
the recipient indicates in any manner that he wishes an appeal, the
social worker should arrange a hearing.120
Notice of the proposed termination and of the right to a hearing must be given sufficiently in advance of the scheduling of the
hearing to permit adequate opportunity to prepare and attend.121
When the notification comes only three days before the adjudicative
proceeding, as it did in Wheeler,1 22 the recipient has inadequate
time to conduct discovery, to submit all the information necessary
to re-establish his eligibility for welfare, and, in general, to prepare
to argue for his livelihood. Such a result does not allow for a meaningful hearing, and consequently does not meet constitutional standards. On the other hand, since the recipient does not need a great
deal of preparation, the permissible period might be as short as a
week, although reasonable extensions should be allowed if the recipient has a legitimate excuse.
The notice must also set forth with particularity the reasons for
116. Comment, Texas Welfare Appeals: The Hidden Right, 46 TEXAS L. REv. 223,
237 (1967).
117. Handler, Controlling Official Behavior in Welfare Administration, 54 CALIF.
L. REv. 479, 494 (1966).
118. Wedemeyer &: Moore, The American Welfare System, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 326, 342
(1966): "[T]he prosecution of an appeal demands a degree of security, awareness,
tenacity, and ability which few dependent people have."
119. See notes 112-14 supra and accompanying text.
120. One commentator argues that the social worker should act as an advocate to
secure ma.ximum benefits for the recipient, and should even institute an appeal, if
necessary. Briar, Welfare from Below: Recipients' 'Views of the Public Welfare System,
54 CALIF. L. REv. 370, 385 (1966).
121. Timeliness is one of the fundamental principles of notice in administrative
hearings. See 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRA.TIVE LAW TREATISE 525-26, 530 (1958). The requirement of timeliness has been applied not only in civil cases, but also in criminal
cases. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33 n.53 (1967). The underlying rationale extends also
to administrative cases. Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407, 413-15 (1955).
122. The California regulation provides that the recipient is to be notified of the
termination at least three days prior to the withholding of the grant, and that the
informal conference may be held at least one day prior to termination. See note 23 supra,
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terinination. 123 Since the recipient will have no other opportunity
before the hearing to discover the case against him, the notice must
include the reasons for termination and the nature and sources of
the information relied on by the welfare agency.124 The state-ap•
proved "Notice of Action" form used in the Wheeler case employs
such cryptic reasons as "Excess property," "Excess income," and
"Change in living arrangement" 125-obviously meaningless terms.
A permissible form of notice must be much more specific.
The pretermination fair hearing procedure, established by the
forthcoming federal regulation, does not fulfill the constitutional
notice requirements. Although it does provide for a timely written
notice of the right to a hearing when benefits are to be terminated,126
it fails to require oral notification.127 Moreover, it does not provide
that the written notice disclose the facts which the recipient must
refute in order to prevail. 128 Thus, even for recipients covered by the
forthcoming regulation, a constitutional decision is necessary to assure minimum adequate notice of the right to a hearing.
As numerous cases have indicated, a meaningful hearing must
also include the right to a personal appearance. 129 Indeed, since the
agency should have before it the facts necessary to determine the
123. Courts have held that "particularity" is another fundamental requirement of
notice. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967).
124. Cf. Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407 (1955), in which a draftee was held
to have a right to see an adverse Justice Department recommendation before he appealed a 1-A classification, so that he could have an opportunity to present facts and
arguments to meet its contentions. That decision interpreted a "silent" statute in view
of "our underlying concepts of procedural regularity and basic fair play." Gonzales
v. United States, 348 U.S. 407,412 (1955).
125. See Brief for the Columbia Center of Social Welfare Policy &: Law as Amicus
Curiae at 37a, Wheeler v. Montgomery, prob. juris. noted, 394 U.S. 970 (1969). See also
Brief for Appellants at 18a-22a, Wheeler v. Montgomery, prob. juris. noted, 394 U.S.
970 (1969).
126. The new federal regulation requires that notice of the opportunity for a hearing be given in writing. HANDBOOK pt. IV, § 6200(£). The requirement that the hearing
be held "at a time, date, and place convenient to the claimant" assures that that notice
will be timely. HANDBOOK pt. IV, § 6200(g).
127. In another place, however, the regulation provides "written notice, and oral
explanation as necessary, are given at the time of . • . termination of assistance."
HANDBOOK pt. IV, § 6300(£). But oral notice should be constitutionally required, not
left to the discretion of the welfare agency.
128. The regulation requires disclosure of the "procedure necessary for ••• preparation," but not of the adverse evidence which is equally necessary for preparation.
HANDBOOK pt. IV, § 6300(1).
129. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 930 (1961); Parker v. Lester, 227 F.2d 708, 716, 717 (9th Cir. 1955); cf. Willner
v. Committee on Character&: Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 103, 105 (1963) (admission to the bar
cannot be denied without an opportunity to confront adverse character witnesses). It
has been said that "argument may be oral or written." Morgan v. United States, 298
U.S. 468, 481 (1936). But written argument should be limited to cases involving highly
educated people. Colorado State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Palmer, 400 P.2d 914
(Colo. 1965) (opportunity to make written submissions is sufficient in the revocation
of a doctor's license). When the hearing is provided for an illiterate welfare recipient,
a requirement that argument be reduced to writing would be palpably unfair.
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continued eligibility of the recipient, and since the recipient is the
best source of information about those facts,1 30 a personal appearance becomes essential. At that personal appearance the government
should disclose, more fully than it did in the notice, reasons for the
termination and the nature and sources of adverse information, so
that the recipient can respond completely to any false claims. When
information is provided by an adverse witness, his identity and a
summary of his testimony should be made available.131 If the recipient states facts which contradict the testimony of the adverse
witness, or if he otherwise challenges the veracity of that witness, the
welfare officials should arrange a confrontation.132 Sine~ the recipient will not usually be represented by counsel in such a confrontation, a right to formal cross-examination, including testimony
under oath, would be of little benefit. A better method might be to
require that the witness whose testimony is challenged be questioned
by a welfare official in the presence of the welfare recipient. Here
again, the fair hearing referred to in the forthcoming federal regulation is deficient. It provides for disclosure of evidence, but fails to
afford an opportunity for confrontation of adverse witnesses. 133
Another constitutional problem in this area is that of who presides over the hearing. There are several possible solutions to the
problem, but the controlling legal principle in setting the minimum
standard is impartiality. "While that principle does not require an
absolute separation of functions, 134 it does require separating the
judicial role from the investigative, for when investigating, prosecuting, and judging functions are combined in a single person, bias
130. See text accompan}ing notes 72-76 supra.
131. Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963); Dixon
v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930
(1961). In Kelly, benefits were terminated on the basis of information from the recipient's landlady, who later evicted the recipient for nonpayment of rent. The landlady's
reports were subsequently proved to be erroneous. Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F.2d 893, 899
(S.D.N.Y. 1968). The right of confrontation will help to prevent such abuses in the fu.
ture.
132. Willner v. Committee on Character 8: Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963). The right
of the recipient to confront adverse witnesses and the desire of the welfare agency
to confront the recipient's witnesses raise the problem of the lack of compulsory process for obtaining those witnesses. However, the welfare agency is not bound by rules of
evidence. If reasonable efforts to obtain attendance are unsuccessful, the same result
might be achieved through a telephone call, although the testimony of a person who,
for no good reason, refuses to appear might be given no weight in the determination.
For the above reasons, then, compulsory process has not been required. Hyser v. Reed,
lll8 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, ll75 U.S. 957 (1963).
133. The regulation provides that a decision be based only on that "evidence and
other material" which the claimant has "an opportunity to hear or see." HANDBOOK
pt. IV, §§ 6200(l), 6300(0). Therefore, under the regulation, a written statement of
an adverse witness could be the basis of a decision even if there were no opportunity
for confrontation.
134. Cf. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 311 (1955) (combination of hearing and
investigating functions in one person in deportation proceedings is not a denial of due
process). But see Amon Treat &: Co. v. SEC, 306 F.2d 260 (D.C. Cir. 1962). See also
United States v. Esperdy, 386 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 935 (1968):
United States ex rel. Catalano v. Shaughnessy, 197 F .2d 65, 67 (2d Cir. 1952).
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is presumed.135 Thus, the caseworker who investigated and prosecuted the case would be an improper person to conduct the hearing.136 Even a higher official, if he had dealt with the case before,
could not be allowed to preside. But a supervisory official who did
not have prior contact with the case could, consistent with due process, conduct the hearing, as could an independent hearing examiner
or an impartial board which included local representatives of poor
people.1a1
Since the minimum constitutional safeguards required in a wel
fare termination hearing consist only of those which are meaningful
in the welfare situation,138 some of the formalities that are required
in a trial context are not meaningful and thus not required when
welfare grants are to be terminated. One of those formalities is direct judicial review of the initial decision. 139 While such review
might be desirable, it has never been constitutionally required in
administrative proceedings.140 Without judicial review, in turn, various other formalities, such as testimony under oath, a record, and
a decision based only on competent evidence in the record, become
unnecessary. Those formalities would not only increase the expense
of the hearing but could add to the insecurity of welfare recipients,
for they might make the hearing seem too much like a trial and thus
tend to make the recipients afraid to speak for fear that their words
would be written dmvn and used against them. 141 Furthermore,
when the administrative decision is final, the record is of no benefit
to the recipient, and the oath is a matter of indifference. The purposes of having a decision on the record are achieved by disclosing
135. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136-37 (1955); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d
807, 813 (2d Cir. 1967).
136. It is psychologically impossible for one who has had the duty to make the case
as strong as possible to judge it impartially. Won Yang Sun v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 44
(1950).
137. On this point, the fair hearing mentioned in the new federal regulation conforms to minimum due process requirements, for it provides that the hearing be
conducted by an impartial official who has had no prior contact with the ca~e.
HANDBOOK pt. IV, §§ 6300(g), (h).
138. See text accompanying notes 107-09 supra.
139. Indeed the current cases attacking the administration of welfare are based on
the review of a court record and not on a direct review of the administrative decision.
140. The right of judicial review has always been based on statutes providing for
review. "(T]he Supreme Court has never held that denial of limited review is a denial
of due process of law." 4 K. DAVIS, ADllUNISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE 106 (1958). When the
government imposes an obligation on the individual, however, the Court has often
strained statutory language to provide some review. For instance, the Court has held
that decisions of draft boards made "final" by statute can be reviewed in habeas corpus
or in criminal proceedings for violation of the draft law. Estep v. United States, 327
U.S. 114 (1946). But welfare cases involve a termination of benefits rather than an
imposition of an obligation. Furthermore, even if judicial review were constitutionally
required, de novo review rather than review of the administrative record would be
sufficient. See Note, Federal Judidal Review of State Welfare Practices, 67 COLUM. L.
R.Ev. 84 (1967).
141. See generally text accompanying note 117 supra.
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to the recipient at the hearing all the evidence against him. Finally,
the presiding welfare official, unless he has had previous practical
experience, is unlikely to know what evidence is competent. Thus,
in light of the nature and use of the determination being made,
these trial-related formalities are not constitutionally required.
Nevertheless, if the state provides for a right to an administrative
appeal or to a judicial review of the hearing decision, even though
that right is not constitutionally required, then a record, an oath,
and a reasoned decision based on competent evidence in the record
would become necessary. 142
The most difficult procedural question concerns the welfare recipient's right to counsel at a termination hearing. It is submitted
that due process does not compel the state to provide counsel or
even to admit the recipient's own counsel to the hearing. Nevertheless, the arguments in favor of the right to have an attorney
present prevent the issue from being clear-cut.
The presence of attorneys in welfare hearings would enable illiterate and inarticulate recipients to understand more clearly the
reasons for the termination of benefits and to overcome their doubts
and fears about the hearing itself.143 Since an attorney has professional skill in fact presentation, he would insist on procedural regularity, and reasoned, consistent interpretations of eligibility criteria.144 Finally, the presence of an attorney would nearly eliminate
the danger of an erroneous termination of benefits.
On the other hand, the welfare termination hearing is investigative rather than adversary, and it has been generally held that
counsel is not constitutionally required in investigative proceedings. Thus, in addition to the historical exclusion of defense counsel from grand jury investigations,145 attorneys have been excluded
from other investigations leading to criminal charges, 146 from preliminary investigations in a deportation proceeding,147 and from
142. It is clear, for example, that a record is required whenever a hearing decision
is subject to direct judicial review. Kwock. Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 455, 464 (1920).
143. See text accompanying notes 114-18 supra.
144. For an extensive discussion of the benefits of the participation of attorneys in
parole-revocation hearings, see Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert-Counsel in the
Peno-Correctional Process, 45 MINN. L. REv. 803, 828-32 (1961).
145. Fro. R. CRIM. P. 6(d) bars defense counsel from the grand jury room during the
hearing. The Supreme Court has upheld this rule, emphasizing the investigative function and the historical nature of the grand jury. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411,
430 (1969).
146. Counsel may be excluded from an investigation to determine the causes of a
fire, even when the investigation may subsequently lead to a prosecution for arson.
In re Graban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957). A private detective, not an attorney, is not entitled
to his own counsel in an inquiry into unethical legal practices which could lead to
criminal prosecution. Anonymous v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287 (1959) (5-4 decision). However,
when the sole purpose of an investigation is to expose criminal violations, then a
witness js entitled to retained counsel. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 430 (1969).
147. Nason v. Immigration &: Naturalizatio°: Serv., 370 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1967).
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draft classification proceedings.148 Indeed, the presence of an attorney would change the character of the hearing from investigative
to adversary. Such a change, as has been stated before,149 would be
detrimental both to the recipients and to the government, for it
would create a trial-like atmosphere which would increase the recipient's uneasiness and would thus stifle a free exchange of information. Moreover, the attorney would not allow the recipient to
volunteer facts detrimental to his case, and would thereby deprive
the welfare agency of its primary source of information.1110 It could
be argued that this would be a beneficial result, since it would prevent the recipient from harming himself. But there are many instances of investigative hearings in which individuals have been
compelled to reveal detrimental information without benefit of
counsel. 151 Thus, if the hearing remains investigative, the mere fact
that an attorney would prevent the recipient from volunteering
harmful information does not mean that his presence is required by
due process.
Another important question in the determination of whether
there is a right to counsel in a welfare termination hearing concerns the extent to which termination of benefits deprives the recipient of his liberty. In recent decisions involving hearings in
which liberty is actually denied, attorneys have usually been admitted or provided.152 In the welfare situation, however, it appears
that the termination of benefits does not involve the deprivation
of liberty. In terms of the deprivation of freedom, termination of
welfare grants is less drastic than parole revocation and is more
nearly equivalent to the expulsion or suspension of students from
schools. Yet in those instances the right to be represented by counsel
has been denied. 1 53
148. United States v. Sturgis, 342 F.2d 328, 332 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879
(1965).
149. See text accompanying note 141 supra.
150. It has been said in the criminal context that "any lawyer worth his salt will
tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to make no statement to police under any
circumstances." Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (Justice Jackson, concurring),
quoted in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 516 (1966) (Justice Harlan, dissenting).
The lawyer in other contexts is no more likely to allow his client to reveal detrimental
information freely.
151. See notes 145-48 supra.
152. The right to retained or appointed counsel has been extended to juvenile
proceedings. In re Gault, 387 U.S. I (1967). Counsel has also been provided in civil
cases in which a deprivation of liberty was involved. For example, an attorney was
required in a case in which a juvenile was committed to a training school for the
feeble-minded. Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968).
153. The parole revocation cases denying a right to counsel are Hodge v. Markley,
339 F.2d 973 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 927 (1965); Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963); Washington v. Hagan, 287 F.2d 332 (3d
Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 927 (1965). With respect to the student expulsion cases,
an attorney was specifically excluded from a hearing which was to decide whether a
high school student would be continued in suspension or removed to a school for
socially maladjusted children. Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967),
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Another important reason for not requiring attorneys in welfare
hearings, although not considered by the courts, is the expense.154
That factor alone is not enough,155 but it adds strength to the
other arguments against the right to counsel. There are literally
millions of welfare recipients who would be eligible for appointed
counsel at every proposed termination or reduction of welfare
benefits. The courts cannot compel the legislatures to appropriate
money for attorneys, and there is a limit to the willingness of the
bar to take cases without fee. 156 In any event, the increase in administrative expense would probably work to the ultimate detriment
of poor people. 157 From the foregoing analysis, then, it appears that
due process does not require that counsel be provided in welfare
termination hearings.
The forthcoming federal regulation, however, provides that, in
categorical assistance programs, "[t]he services of lawyers will be
made available to welfare applicants and recipients who desire them
in fair hearings."158 That provision, although not constitutionally
necessary, may have some beneficial effects.159 But more probably,
it will lead to the troubles described above-the change from an
investigative to an adversary proceeding160 and a substantial increase in the governmental expense.161 Moreover, the provision for
assigned counsel could adversely affect the constitutional safeguards
required in a termination proceeding.162 Thus, that provision appears to be not only unnecessary, but impractical and, possibly,
detrimental.
Similar problems arise with respect to the questions whether
cert. denied, !190 U.S. 1028 (1968). An attorney was also excluded from a hearing to
expel a college student from a state school. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294
F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, !168 U.S. 9!10 (1961).
154. The expense of providing attorneys has not been considered in the major
criminal cases which have guaranteed the right to counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright, !172
U.S. !1!15 (196!1); Douglas v. California, !172 U.S. !15!1 (196!1); Griffin v. Illinois, !151 U.S.
12 (1956). In the context of welfare hearings, however, the cost of providing counsel has
been considered. Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
155. See text accompanying notes 91-95 supra.
156. Under the new federal regulation, attorneys must be provided (see text accompanying note 158 infra) and the federal government pays 75% of the cost. !14 Fed. Reg.
1144 (1959).
157. See note 91 supra.
158. l!4 Fed. Reg. 1144 (1969).
159. See text accompanying notes 14!1-44 supra.
160. See text accompan}ing notes 149-50 supra.
161. See text accompanying notes 155-57 supra.
162. For instance, welfare officials, faced with the task of enforcing an impractical
regulation, cannot easily refuse to provide the counsel required by that regulation;
but, in order to reduce the number of hearing requests, they could give inadequate
notice of the right to a hearing and still not violate the literal language of the regulation. That procedure might be workable, but it would not solve the problem of erroneous terminations of benefits. To prevent such a result, a decision specifying a
constitutional minimum notice requirement becomes even more clearly necessary.
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the state is constitutionally required to admit a recipient's own
counsel to the hearing and, if not, whether it is compelled to exclude his counsel. A requirement that states must permit recipients'
own counsel to participate raises the problem of equal protection.163
Recipients aided by counsel get as much as they are entitled to have,
while unrepresented recipients often get less.164 The discrimination
is based on financial ability or access to free counsel, neither of
which is a rational criterion for continuing welfare benefits. Moreover, a requirement that states admit recipients' own counsel would
result in substantial costs, for the welfare agency might be compelled
to augment its investigative and legal staff. Finally, if the recipient
retains counsel, there is a prima fade abuse of welfare benefits
which are supposed to be paid only to those who cannot afford to
live without them. The scarce gratuitous legal assistance presently
available is probably better allocated to the defense of indigent
criminal defendants. Thus, it appears that the states need not admit recipients' own counsel if they do not want to do so.
But, if that is true, the question arises whether states are constitutionally required to exclude recipients' own counsel. The equal
protection rationale argues that all counsel should be prohibited,
but that contention is probably not strong enough to defeat a state
statute providing for participation of retained counsel but not for
appointment of counsel. In fact, some courts have construed parole
statutes giving the parolee "an opportunity to appear" as implying
the right to appear with counsel.165 Thus, in some states, recipients'
own counsel might be admitted through an analogous interpretation
of welfare statutes. In practical terms, the multiplicity of suits involving the termination of welfare benefits demonstrates the availability of counsel in many communities to challenge welfare proceedings in the courts.
V.

PRACTICAL PROBLEMS .Ai"ID CONCLUSIONS

A full and adequate constitutional hearing prior to the termination of welfare grants is, in practical terms, likely to be expensive
and to encumber the expeditious administration of the welfare system. The same problem will probably exist under the forthcoming
federal regulation providing for the continuation of benefits until a
fair hearing. An in-depth study has shown that "many recipients
cheat or continue to accept aid after they no longer need it." 166 Thus,
163. Cf. Earnest v. Willingham, 406 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1969) (parole board must
provide counsel for indigent parolees if it permits retained counsel in any revocation
hearing).
164-. See text accompanying notes 143-4-4- supra.
165. Boddie v. Weakley, 356 F.2d 242 (4th Cir. 1966); Fleming v. Tate, 156 F.2d 848
(D.C. Cir. 1946).
166. Briar, Welfare fr-0m Below: Recipients' Views of the Public Welfare System,
54 CALIF, L. REv. 370, 882 (1966).
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if welfare recipients have notice that benefits can be extended by requesting a hearing, the probable result is that nearly all recipients
who are notified of a proposed termination will request hearings,
regardless of the merits of their claims of eligibility. Accordingly,
benefits will have to be continued to them until the hearings can be
held-a very costly procedure. And the more hearings are requested,
the longer that interim period with its paid benefits will be, so that
the welfare agencies' backlog could be close to a year. In addition,
both the cost and the backlog will be increased even more under the
new federal regulation, since counsel will have to be provided in
categorical assistance cases.167 That counsel will have to be paid by
the state, and the time it takes to assign counsel and the -preparation
and tactics which an attorney is likely to employ will result in a
further delay of hearings. Obviously, such procedures are highly impractical.
Of course, as has been demonstrated, this impracticality does
not mean that the constitutionally required prior hearing may be
eliminated.168 But it does indicate the necessity for effective practical
solutions to these problems. The essence of the dilemma is to devise
a system of providing fair procedures without inducing recipients
with unmeritorious claims to request hearings. To do so, the delay
between the initial decision to terminate benefits and the hearing
must be eliminated. The obvious solution, of course, is to provide
an administrative staff large enough to make prompt hearings possible. But that procedure is also expensive, and if the state's welfare
budget is limited to a fixed amount, the money that now goes to the
welfare recipients-even those awaiting a hearing, who are needy
whether or not they are eligible-would go to the added staff. Thus,
other solutions must be sought.169
167. See note 158 supra and accompanying te.xt.
168. See text accompanying notes 77-98 supra. The requirement that counsel be provided, however, may be eliminated without violating the due process clause. See text
accompanying notes 143-62 supra.
169, Professor Douglas Q. Wickham has proposed a two-step procedure to deal
with these problems. Public Welfare Administration: Quest for a Workable Solution, 58
GEO. L.J. No. 1 (Oct. 1969). Under his proposal, an informal conference, probably
including notice and a personal appearance, but not other minimum constitutional
&afeguards, would be held prior to the fair hearing required by the new federal regulation. Benefits, however, would continue until the fair hearing, if requested, is completed, and that fair hearing would include the full constitutional safeguards. Wickham
hopes that since the informal conference would eliminate most of the erroneous
decisions, requests for fair hearings would be reduced to a manageable number.
But implicit in his argument are two questionable assumptions. The first is that an
informal conference with notice and a personal appearance would eliminate most erroneous decisions. It has been demonstrated, however, that to provide the recipient with
a reasonable opportunity to correct error, the hearing must be conducted by an impartial
official, and it must include a complete disclosure of evidence and an opportunity to
confront adverse witnesses. There is no rational basis for including some minimum
safeguards in the informal conference while omitting others. Unless all of the minimum safeguards are provided, a significant number of erroneous decisions must be
expected. Therefore, the proposed informal conference would not guarantee a correct
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But the problems of practicality are not the concern of the
courts and cannot be solved by judicial action. The present task
for the courts-particularly for the Supreme Court-is to apply
the dictates of due process to protect welfare recipients from the
hardships of an erroneous termination of benefits. Due process
should be held to require an opportunity for a full and adequate
hearing before benefits are terminated.170 The decision should specify the required minimum procedural safeguards-oral notice of
the right to a hearing,171 a personal appearance,172 the disclosure
of evidence, 173 the opportunity to confront adverse witnesses, 174 and
an impartial decision maker.175
The importance to welfare recipients of a decision defining the
constitutional standard is difficult to overemphasize. A constitutional claim is their key to access to the courts.176 Indeed, it is the
expectation of a constitutional requirement that has led to the recent state and federal regulations ending the pervasive governmental practice of terminating benefits before a hearing. But even the
forthcoming federal regulation, providing for the continuation of
benefits until a fair hearing, is inadequate. It fails to contain the
minimum procedural safeguards, will be difficult to enforce, and
might well be withdrawn by the present administration. A constitutional decision, then, is necessary to remedy these deficiencies.
Finally, the practices followed by the states in administering general
assistance will depend on a constitutional standard.177 Once a full
and adequate hearing is constitutionally required, welfare administrators, legislators, and commentators interested in welfare should
devise methods of making the hearing procedure more practical.
decision, and would not destroy a recipient's expectation that an adverse decision might
be reversed in a fair hearing.
Wickham's second assumption is that the conference would lessen the number of the
costly fair hearings. That assumption may be valid for the situation in which the
finding at the conference is that benefits should be continued, since in that case there
would be no need for a hearing. But if the decision at the conference is against the
recipient, he would invariably request a fair hearing, if not to get a reversal, at least
for the purpose of obtaining continued benefits. In many cases, then, the proposal
would make two hearings necessary before benefits could be terminated, The individuals
penalized by this system would be the scrupulously honest welfare recipients, who
would not request fair hearings, and the taxpayers.
170. See text accompanying notes 64-98 supra.
171. See text accompanying notes 112-20 supra.
172. See notes 129-30 supra and accompanying text.
173. See text accompanying notes 123-25, 129-31 supra.
174. See text accompanying notes 132-33 supra.
175. See text aa;ompanying notes 134-37 supra.
176. See text accompanying notes 34-39 supra.
177. For a more complete discussion of the necessity for a constitutional decision,
see text accompanying notes 28-50 supra.

